Why New START Had to End

By: Michael Mazza |

New START, the Obama-era nuclear arms control agreement, expires today. For the first time since 1972, there is no treaty limiting the nuclear arsenals of both Russia and the United States. The end, for now, of the arms control era is an unfortunate necessity.

New START may have prevented a renewed U.S.-Russia arms race over the last 15 years, but it did not prevent proliferation. Between 2011 and 2025, North Korea increased its stockpile from less than 10 weapons to 50, India from 80-100 to 180, Pakistan from 90-110 to 170, and China from 200 to 600. Indeed, China is engaged in the world’s fastest buildup since the Cold War’s scariest days. Beijing’s stockpile is expected to grow to 1,000 weapons by the end of the decade.

This buildup comes as China diversifies and modernizes its suite of delivery vehicles and debates doctrinal innovations. As it fields theater-range weapons and dual-capable anti-ship missiles, it is only prudent to question whether Beijing is moving beyond a minimum deterrent posture and even considering nuclear warfighting. Put simply, nuclear weapons are taking on a more prominent role in Beijing’s national security.

This is destabilizing. As it wears away at America’s numerical nuclear advantage, China will gain greater confidence in its ability to deter both nuclear and conventional attack—and will thus become more likely to convince itself it can attack Taiwan, and perhaps even US treaty allies like Japan and South Korea, without incurring an armed American response.

A proliferation of shorter-range delivery vehicles will also give Xi Jinping another tool with which to coerce his neighbors. Officially, China “undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states.” Other countries in the region can be forgiven if they are not reassured—and forgiven for considering nuclear arsenals of their own.

This problem was not addressable when New START was in force. As long as American and Russian arsenals were limited, China had no reason to limit its own. Rather, it had an opportunity, and perhaps an incentive, to narrow the gap in arsenal size, if not race for parity. But now, Washington can put Beijing in a position in which China wants to restrain the United States.

Doing so does not require the United States to build tens of thousands of warheads as it did during the Cold War. It does require forces sufficient to more effectively prevent escalation during a conventional conflict; to limit damage to the homeland in the event of escalation; to credibly respond to Chinese regional nuclear use; and when necessary, distasteful as it might sound, to coerce Beijing in ways conducive to American and allied interests.

The world is entering a new period of nuclear competition. That does not mean catastrophe is on the horizon. Indeed, arms control will remain an important tool for advancing U.S. national security interests. The task now is for Washington to set the conditions in which that tool can be wielded effectively.