December 18, 2025

ICYMI: Engaging the PICs: Offering Reliable Alternatives Beyond Beijing

Institute for Indo-Pacific Security

On December 12, the Institute for Indo-Pacific Security hosted an online event: “Engaging the PICs: Offering Reliable Alternatives Beyond Beijing.” The event discussed how the U.S., Japan, and other like-minded countries can better align their respective efforts to deepen engagements with the Pacific Island Countries (PICs). The event featured CAPT Brent Sadler (ret. USN), Senior Research Fellow for Naval Warfare and Advanced Technology at the Heritage Foundation, and Mr. Ryosuke Hanada, a PhD candidate and lecturer at Macquarie University and former research fellow for the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) as speakers, followed by Q&As.

Mr. Hanada discussed the strategic importance of PICs, noting that they are located around the primary maritime routes between the United States and Asia. He pointed out that China’s growing influence in the region threatens key access points for the U.S. in the event of a conflict with China. In this context, Hanada discussed Japan’s efforts to focus its assistance for the PICs on maritime security. In addition to traditional development aid forums such as the Pacific Island Leaders Meeting (PALM), the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force has increased its engagement in the region. Japan has also recently supplemented its Official Development Assistance activities with an assistance program under the Official Security Assistance (OSA) framework, which links development assistance to Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy. Hanada referenced a recent OSA grant awarded to the Kingdom of Tonga to enhance its security capabilities as an example.

CAPT Sadler focused his opening remarks on U.S. relations with the islands in the Pacific including U.S. territories. He noted that the United States stations military bases on its three main U.S. territories in the Pacific: Guam, Northern Mariana Islands and American Samoa. The U.S. also holds Compact of Free Association agreements with the states of Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), and the Marshall Islands, through which the U.S. provides economic assistance in exchange for veto power on third party relations. Sadler praised the work of the Pacific Quad, a framework that includes the U.S., Australia, New Zealand, and France, arguing that these countries can play a larger role in coordinating allied engagement in the Pacific. He urged the U.S. to pay more attention on the Pacific Islands, particularly given China’s growing economic influence in the region and its efforts to establish a greater security presence; Sadler highlighted recent revelations that China has almost completely refurbished an old military airfield on FSM island state of Yap, as an example of such efforts.

During the Q&A sessions, the speakers further discussed France’s role in the region, which is often overlooked considering its geographic distance from the Pacific. Hanada explained that France’s reputation among PICs has improved overall since it stopped nuclear testing programs in 1996. He noted that today, France regularly employs forces in the region for joint operations with allied countries. Hanada also discussed France’s historic role in managing its overseas territories in the region and its effort to manage civil unrest in New Caledonia. He noted the signing of the Bougival Accord on July 12, 2025, which would grant the territory greater autonomy. To this, Sadler cautioned that Chinese influence operations within New Caledonia are eroding goodwill towards France, leading to waning support for the Accords.

Hanada and Sadler also discussed the best method for tracking the extensive list of initiatives and programs in the Pacific Island region, noting limited success of past efforts to track them. Sadler suggested that a better alternative might be for the countries to establish specific goals and align their respective efforts accordingly. He also argued that the most effective way to create these goals was to leverage the attention of senior leaders which would mobilize embassies and other resources on the islands. In this context, he noted that former President Joe Biden cancelling a trip to Papua New Guinea was a missed opportunity to coordinate with Prime Minister Narendra Modi who was visiting the island at the time.

Both speakers discussed Palau, next year’s host for the Pacific Island Forum. Hanada explained that Palau has a very close relationship with Japan, with the Palauan President Surangel Whipps Jr. being the first leader to visit Japan after Takaichi Sanae was elected prime minister. However, Sadler noted that while Whipps supports Japan and the United States, all the candidates to take the president’s place in the next election cycle are pro-China. He also observed that illegal immigration and the criminal activities by the groups such as Chinese Triad syndicate have been straining the country’s prison system.

Hanada and Sadler then debated how the United States and Japan should engage with the PICs on recognition of Taiwan. Hanada noted that Taiwan is an important ally for some Pacific Island countries, but many have already switched allegiance towards Beijing. He argued that the United States and Japan should not push the PICs to take a position, but at the same time they should not overlook the recognition issue. Sadler took a more definite stance, arguing that the PICs should be encouraged to keep their recognition of Taiwan, and resist Chinese influence operations. Sadler shared his critical view of the Pacific Island Forum, questioning the prospect of meaningful activity being conducted at the forum. He suggested that mini-lateral forums like the aforementioned Pacific Quad, with Japan as an additional participant, can be a more effective framework for coordinating relations with the PICs.

Throughout their discussion, both Hanada and Sadler also highlighted the “perception gap” between the PICs on the one hand and the U.S., Japan and other allies and partners on the other that are often overlooked. They referred to specific examples, including the perception of the terms such as “maritime security” and “climate” change” among the PICs are often different from those held by the U.S., Japan, and other allied countries that engage with them. For example, the PICs place greater emphasis on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing and smuggling when they discuss “maritime security,” while allied countries are more concerned with military issues, and protecting the Pacific sea lines of communication. Similarly, while allies are also concerned about sea level rise, “climate change” for the PICs is particularly important from the perspective of disaster resilience of their in-country infrastructure and sustainment of critical service. They suggested that U.S., Japan and their like-minded partners that are interested in supporting PICs need to be mindful of these perception gaps for their engagement with PICs to be impactful.

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