Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China: Doubling Down

By: Ann Kowalewski |

On October 23rd, the Fourth Plenary Session of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 20th Central Committee concluded. This annual meeting of CCP leadership sets the tone for the Party’s economic and national security priorities, and this year’s priorities were clear: the Party is doubling down on its economic development strategy and strengthening its national security tools. 

First, the CCP is doubling down on self-reliance, even “accelerating high-level scientific and technological self-reliance and self-strengthening to lead the development of new quality productive forces.” It is a common misconception that China does not want to decouple from the United States: China clearly wants to decouple, as is apparent in its own economic strategies dating to 2015, just on its own terms and timeline. When Chinese officials say they do not want to decouple, or that China will “expand international circulation,” it means the CCP wants to keep selling Chinese-made products to external markets, not that the Party will ease its grip on manufacturing supply chains, give up its leverage over key supply chain nodes, or reduce the amount of state subsidization that allows Chinese products to flood the market at low prices. 

Second, official coverage of the Fourth Plenum mentioned the strengthening of the “national security shield” tied to self-reliance and economic security measures, indicating that China is also doubling down on its extraterritorial economic security apparatus. From strengthening the regulations around its Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law to the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) notices expanding the reach of Chinese export controls to machines and processes that use certain Chinese rare earth elements, the CCP has clearly shifted from setting up the infrastructure needed to target overseas companies and economies to implementation.

Third, the Party clearly believes its industrial policy has worked thus far and has no plans to change course. Discussions about keeping a “reasonable proportion” of manufacturing and “accelerat[ing] the development of a strong manufacturing economy” suggest China’s foundational economic model, coupling its strong manufacturing base with heavy state interference and state subsidization, will continue. Clearly, the Party sees its manufacturing strength (and leverage gained from that strength) as core to its national power as it doubles down on industrial reform, relegating reforms to drive consumption and expand its service economy to the back seat.  

Fourth, the Fourth Plenum communique’s emphasis on “disseminating influence of Chinese civilization” suggests the CCP is elevating the expansion of Chinese soft power to a core national interest. We’ve already seen some successes in this strategy in the information space, with an uptick of social media accounts and entire apps designed to promote traditional Chinese culture, bots and paid influencers highlighting PRC technological development, and pro-China narratives from tourists on government-sponsored travel trips through China. This suggests that the CCP considers its national power as not only rooted in its economic might, but in its technological prowess, which it can use to promote its image abroad. 

Finally, the appointment of Zhang Shengmin as Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission suggests General Secretary Xi Jinping is continuing to prioritize an anti-corruption campaign aimed at his senior military leadership. The high number of purges of top brass military officials seem to be a feature, not a bug, of Xi’s drive to transform the military into a honed force that is able to fight on his command. The appointment of Zhang, a lead anti-corruption investigator and PLA Rocket Force general (a branch which has seen most of the purges) suggests Xi is confident that the purges were necessary and have not compromised long-term PLA goals. The PLA’s acceleration of pace and complexity in its military exercises despite the purges also suggests they have not reduced military readiness or stretched CCP timelines to modernize the military to be one capable of fighting and winning in the coming years.

This year’s plenum came the week after China rolled out its most extensive export control regulations on some rare earth exports and following a series of senior military purges. From the published communiqué to the Chinese media reporting around the plenum, it is clear those actions were indicators of how the Party intends to conduct national security and economic statecraft going forward.